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Abstract
We present a three player Bayesian game for which there is no ǫ-equilibria
in Borel measurable strategies for small enough positive ǫ, however there are
non-measurable equilibria.
Key words: Bayesian games, non-amenable semi-group action, equilibrium
existence
1 Introduction
Game theory is about strategies and the expected payoffs resulting from
these strategies. The fundamental concept of game theory is that of an
equilibrium, strategies for each player such that no player prefers to switch
to another strategy, given that the strategies of the other players remain
fixed. An ǫ-equilibrium for any ǫ ≥ 0 is defined in the same way – no player
prefers by more than ǫ to switch to another strategy. An equilibrium is a
0-equilibrium.
What do we mean by a player preferring some strategy over another by at
least ǫ? Implied by a preference is an evaluation in an ordered field, usually
the real numbers. Conventionally we assume that there is a topological
probability space on which the game takes place, that each player is assigned
a Borel sigma field corresponding to its knowledge of the space, and that
that the players choose strategies that are measurable with respect to their
respective Borel sigma fields. Given fixed measurable strategies of the other
players, the evaluation of a strategy for a player is global, an integration
of a function over the whole probability space. When the players attain an
ǫ-equilibrium by this criteria, a global or Harsanyi ǫ-equilibrium is obtained.
On the other hand, a player could orient itself locally to some minimal sets
in its sigma algebra, known as information sets (should they exist), and
maximise its payoff with regard to these sets and its knowledge of them
(which we presume is consistent with its knowledge of the whole probability
space through regular conditional distributions). When each player at each
such minimal set cannot obtain more than ǫ with the payoff evaluated locally
at this set, a Bayesian ǫ-equilibrium is obtained.
Bayesian games are ancient, most card games being good examples. J.
Harsanyi (1967) introduced a global theoretical perspective to Bayesian games,
the origin of the term Harsanyi equilibrium. P. Milgrom and R. Weber (1985)
asked implicitly the question whether Bayesian games always have measur-
able equilibria after proving existence for a special class of Bayesian games
and analysing a game which did not belong to that class. R. Simon (2003)
demonstrated an example of a three player Bayesian game for which there
is no Borel measurable equilibrium however there are many non-measurable
equilibria. This example was made possible by a structure of knowledge for
which always the players have common knowledge of a countable set of mea-
sure zero. These sets of measure zero give no orientation for compiling the
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many local equilibria toward Borel measurable strategies. Indeed, elemen-
tary applications of ergodic theory showed that Borel measurable equilibria
could not exist.
A significant advance was performed by Z. Hellman (2014). He showed that
there is a two-player Bayesian game with Bayesian equilibria but no Bayesian
ǫ-equilibrium that is also Borel measurable for small enough positive ǫ. This
discovery was advanced further by Z. Hellman and J. Levy (2016), in which it
was demonstrated that a broad class of knowledge structures support games
for which the same holds. This paper serves well as a general source to
the structure, problems, and history of Bayesian games, especially in their
relation to countable equivalence relations that are amenable.
It is required of a Bayesian ǫ-equilibrium that throughout the space each
player cannot gain locally more than ǫ through an alternative strategy. How-
ever in a Harsanyi ǫ -equilibrium there could be a player who, according to
the strategies defining the ǫ equilibrium, could improve its payoff by as much
as B > 0 at a set of measure no more than ǫ/B. A Borel measurable Bayesian
ǫ-equilibrium is a Harsanyi ǫ-equilbrium, but not vice versa. Indeed it is not
difficult to show that for every ǫ > 0 there are Harsanyi ǫ-equilibria to the
Hellman game cited above.
One can perceive sets of very small measure where a player can act foolishly as
a kind of firewall, absorbing the problems of the measurability requirement.
Amenable structures tend to allow for such firewalls; for example with the
closely related topic of Borel colouring; see Kechris, et all (1999). Therefore
we would not have expected to find a game example lacking Harsanyi ǫ equi-
libria (yet possessing Bayesian equilibria) without utilizing a non-amenable
structure.
In this paper we demonstrate that there is a Bayesian game played on a
topological probability space Ω for which there are no Harsanyi ǫ-equilibria
for all ǫ ≤ 1
1000
, and yet there are non-measurable Bayesian equilibria that
employ pure strategies almost everywhere (pure meaning all weight given to
one action). Because Ω is a Cantor set and the concern is the existence of
approximate equilibria, moving from Borel to Lesbegue measurability does
not alter the result.
As long as a game has an Harsanyi ǫ-equilibrium for every positive ǫ there is
an equilibrium payoff, namely a cluster point of payoffs corresponding to the
ǫ-equilibria as ǫ goes to 0. By this interpretation of an equilibrium payoff,
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ours is a Bayesian game that has equilibria, but no equilibrium payoff.
With our example, there is no proper subset of the probability space for
which the players have common knowledge, hence the arguments used are
different from that of previous Bayesian games that lack Harsanyi equilibria
but have Bayesian equilibria (which do utilize countable equivalence rela-
tions). Nevertheless we use a non-amenable semi-group action that contains
some similarities to the structure of the Hellman example.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we de-
fine the game, followed in the third section by a proof that this game has
no Harsanyi 1
1000
-equilibrium. In the fourth section we show that it does
have non-measurable Bayesian equilibria. The concluding fifth section is a
presentation of open problems.
2 The Game:
Let G+ be the free semi-group generated by the non-negative powers of the
two generators T1 and T2, with e the identity included in G
+. Let X be the
space {0, 1}G+, with an x ∈ X a collection of the form (xe, xT1 , xT2 , xT1T2 , xT2T1 ,
xT
2
1 , xT
2
2 , . . . ) with xU ∈ {0, 1} for every U ∈ G+. For both i = 1, 2 define
Ti : X → X to be the shift: Ti(x)V = xTiV for all V ∈ G+, and for every
U, V ∈ G+ define U : X → X by U(x)V = xUV . This defines a right action
of G+ on X , meaning that UV (x) = V ◦U(x). For every x ∈ X define G+(x)
to be the countable set {U(x) | U ∈ G+}. Very important to the structure
of X is that for every x, y ∈ X there are two z1, z2 ∈ X such that T1(zi) = x
and T2(zi) = y for both i = 1, 2. We call the points the twins determined
by x and y. We place the canonical probability distribution m on X which
gives 1
2
to each 0 or 1 placed in each position of G+ and independently, so
that a cylinder defined by n positions is given the probability 2−n. With
this probability distribution, we see that all U ∈ G+ are measure preserving
actions, meaning that m(U−1A) = m(A) for all Borel subsets A.
Of special importance, the indendence probability assumption on each po-
sition implies that the distribution m on X can be reconstructed from the
measure preserving property of T1 : X → X and T2 : X → X , its product
distribution m2, combined with the equal probability given to both twins.
Let D be the set D := {r, g}, r for red r and g for green. The probability
3
space on which the game is played will be Ω := D×X . We define the topology
on Ω to be that induced by the clopen (closed and open) sets defined by the
set D and the cylinder sets of X , so that Ω is a Cantor set. We define the
canonical probability distribution µ on Ω so that for each choice of d ∈ D
and 0 or 1 in n distinct positions the probability for this cylinder set will be
1
2
2−n. For example, µ gives the set {(r, x) | xe = 0, xT1 = 1} the probability
1
8
. The measure µ is the common prior for the game, meaning the Borel
probability measure by which the game is defined.
There are three players, labelled G0, R1, R2. The information sets of each
player are defined as follows. For each x ∈ X Player G0 considers (g, x) and
(r, x) possible, and with equal 1
2
probability, and these two points constitute
its information set. For each i = 1, 2 and each x Player Ri consider (r, x)
and {g} × T−1i (x) possible, with the point (r, x) and the set {g} × T−1i x
of equal 1
2
probability, and this pairing of a point with the corresponding
Cantor set is its information set. Notice that this belief by the player Ri is
consistent with the probability distribution on Ω, as the measure preserving
property of the Ti implies that m(T
−1
i (A)) = m(A) for all Borel subsets A of
X . If B is the information set of a player, it means that this player cannot
distinguish between any two points of this set and therefore has to conduct
the same behaviour throughout the set. The Borel sigma algebra defining the
knowledge of a player is that induced by these information sets, meaning the
collection of all Borel sets B such that every information set of this player is
either inside of B or disjoint from B.
All players have only two actions. The red players R1 and R2 have the actions
a0, a1 and the green player G0 has the actions b0, b1.
For either player Ri the only payoff that matters is that obtained at those
states labelled r, and for the player G0 the same is true for those states
labelled g. There are two equivalent approaches to be taken, illustrated
for a player Ri. Either the payoff obtained at (r, x), described below, is
duplicated at all the other points in the same information set, namely the set
{g}×T−1i (x), or the payoffs obtained at (r, x), described below, is multiplied
by 2 and at all other points in the same information set the payoff is 0.
Though the latter interpretation may be better suited to some theoretical
approaches, as it employs the probability distribution µ on Ω, we will assume
throughout the former equivalent interpretation (and for Player G0 as well).
This will allow us to focus on the set X and its probability distribution m.
4
The a0 and a1 pertain to actions of Player G0 at both (g, x) and (r, x). If
xe = 0 then the payoff matrices for the players Ri at the states (r, x) are
R1
a0 a1
b0 300 0
b1 0 100
and R2
a0 a1
b0 100 0
b1 0 300
.
If xe = 1 then the payoff matrices at (r, x) are reversed:
R1
a0 a1
b0 100 0
b1 0 300
and R2
a0 a1
b0 300 0
b1 0 100
.
More complex are the payoffs of the player G0 at a state labelled g. The
matrix is three dimensional, meaning that it is a 2 × 2 × 2 matrix. We
need only to describe a 2× 2 matrix corresponding to each action of the G0
player. The rows and columns stand for the actions of the R1 and R2 players,
respectively. Those actions a0 and a1 are performed by the R1 player at both
(g, x) and (r, T1x) and by the R2 player at both (g, x) and (r, T2x). First we
describe the payoff matrices if xe = 0:
b0
a0 a1
a0 1000 0
a1 0 2000
b1
a0 a1
a0 0 1000
a1 2000 0
On the other hand, if xe = 1 then the structure of payoffs is reversed:
b0
a0 a1
a0 0 1000
a1 2000 0
b1
a0 a1
a0 2000 0
a1 0 1000
A strategy of a player is a function from its collection of information sets to
the probability distributions on its two actions (a one dimensional simplex).
The strategy is Borel measurable if that function is measurable with respect
to its Borel sigma algebra (which is defined canonically as above from its
information sets).
Notice that however the G0 player acts at some (g, x), that action is copied at
(r, x) (because the G0 player cannot distinguish between these two points).
However the Ri players respond at (r, x), those actions are copied at the
5
sets {g} × T−1i (x) respectively (as the Ri player cannot distinguish between
(r, x) and {g} × T−1i (x)). The behaviour of a player at (g, x) or (r, x) will
influence inductively the behaviour of all players at an uncountable subset
leading upward through repetitive applications of the T−1i . However the
behaviour of players that influences inductively a player’s payoff at (g, x) or
(r, x) lie entirely within the countable set D × G+(x). With regard to this
latter aspect of influence, our game shares similarity with those defined by
countable equivalence relations.
3 No Harsanyi 1
1000
-equilibria
Before we show that the game has no Harsanyi 1
1000
-equilibrium, we focus in
on the subset {g} ×X .
Let A0 be the subset ofX such that the probability that Player G0 at {g}×A0
chooses b0 is at least
19
20
. Let A1 be the corresponding subset of X such that
the probability that Player G0 chooses b1 is at least
19
20
. Let AM be the subset
X\(A0 ∪ A1).
As a general rule, from the above payoff matrices and the assumption that
players are following their interests (the interests of the Ri players at (r, x)
being that of conveying the choice of the G0 player at (g, x)), we would expect
that if T1(x) ∈ Ai and T2(x) ∈ Aj, and xe = k then x ∈ Ai+j+k where i+j+k
is represented modulo two. We call this the parity rule, and say that this
rule holds for a point (g, x) whenever these three containments are true. We
say that the parity rule holds for any x ∈ X when it holds for (g, x).
If any player chooses both actions at some point with strictly more than 1
20
we say that the player is mixing at that point (meaning in AM when this
player is G0). If there is a player and a set A of measure at least w > 0
where that player prefers one strategy over another by at least r > 0 and
either that player is mixing or choosing the non-preferred action, then that
player can gain at least rw
20
by choosing a different strategy. Therefore in an
ǫ equilibrium it follows that w is at most 20ǫ
r
. This simple fact is the bridge
between the equilibrium concept and the semi-group action on X .
With respect to an ǫ-equilibrium for sufficiently small enough ǫ, there are two
aspects of the game very important to our following arguments, First, where
the strategies in approximate equilibrium are not mixing, they tend to fall
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into the parity rule and stay there. Second, mixing is strongly discouraged
by the structure of the payoffs. Looking at the payoffs of the R1 and R2
players at (r, x), it is not possible for G0 at (g, x) and (r, x) to make both
other players indifferent to their two different actions. And then if z0 and z1
are twins, namely Ti(z0) = Ti(z1) for both i = 1, 2, if the Ri player is not
mixing at (r, Ti(zj)) for at least one of i = 1, 2, it is not possible for the G0
player at (g, zj) to be indifferent to its two actions at both j = 0, 1. This
dynamic is formalised in the next lemma.
Lemma 1: For every x ∈ X , either one or the other corresponding Player
R1 or R2 at (r, x) has an incentive of at least 80 to choose either a0 or a1
over the other action. Let x, y ∈ X be any two points in X and let z0 and z1
be the two twins where T1(zi) = x and T2(zi) = y for i = 0, 1 and z
e
0 = 0 and
ze1 = 1. If one of R1 or R2 is mixing at (r, x) or (r, y), respectively, and the
other is not, then Player G0 at either (g, z0) or at (g, z1) has an incentive of
at least 80 to choose either b0 or b1 over the other strategy.
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that xe = 0 and that the Player
G0 at (g, x) chooses b0 with probability at least
1
2
. By choosing a1 the R1
player would get no more than 50 and by choosing a0 the R1 player would
get at least 150. On the other hand, if the Player G0 at (g, x) chooses b1
with probability at least 1
2
then the R2 player would get no more than 50 by
choosing a0 and at least 150 by choosing a1.
Next, due to symmetries, it suffices to consider the two cases of the R2 player
choosing a0 with probability no more than
1
20
and the R2 player choosing a1
with probability no more than 1
20
.
Let w ≤ 1
20
be the probability that the R2 player chooses a0. We break this
case into two subcases, where Player R1 chooses a0 with at least
3
5
and where
Player R1 chooses a0 with at most
3
5
. If Player R1 chooses a0 with at least
3
5
then the G0 player at (g, z1) gets at least 570 for playing b0 and no more
than 400(1−w)+2000w for playing b1, which reaches a maximum of 480 at
w = 1
20
. If Player R1 chooses a1 with at least
2
5
then the G0 player at (g, z0)
gets at least 760 from choosing b0 and no more than 600(1−w)+ 2000w for
playing b1, which reaches a maximum of 670 at w =
1
20
.
Now let w ≤ 1
20
be the probability that the R2 player chooses a1. We break
this case into two subcases, where Player R1 chooses a0 with at least
3
5
and
where Player R1 chooses a0 with at most
3
5
. If Player R1 chooses a0 with at
least 3
5
then the G0 player at (g, z1) get at least 1140 from choosing b1 and
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no more than 820 by choosing b0. If Player R1 chooses a1 with at least
2
5
then the G0 player at (g, z0) gets at least 780 from choosing b1 and no more
than 600(1−w)+2000w from choosing b0, which reaches a maximum of 670
at w = 1
20
. ✷
The consequence of Lemma 1 is that the players are hardly ever mixing in
an approximate equilibrium. That is formalized in the next lemma.
Lemma 2: In any 1
1000
Borel measurable equilibrium of the game, the G0
player mixes with probability less than 16
10,000
and the parity rule holds for all
but at most 4
1000
of the space X .
Proof: Let B1 be the subset of z ∈ AM such that the corresponding R1
player at (r, T1z) is mixing and let B2 be the subset of z ∈ AM such that
the corresponding R2 Player at (r, T2z) is mixing. Let c = m(AM), a =
m(B1) and b = m(B2). As the T1z and T2z are distributed independently
as variables of z, in an 1
1000
equilibrium the following holds: c ≤ 1
4000
+ ab +
1
2
(
a+ b
)
, where the 1
4000
refers to the maximum probability for the G0 player
to choose a strategy that is suboptimal by a quantity of at least 80, the ab
refers to the probability that both Ri are mixing at both T1z, and
a+b
2
refers
to the probability that Player G0’s actions are within 80 of each other for
one but not both of the twins z0 and z1 (where one or the other of R1 at T1zi
or R2 at T2zi are mixing, but not both). But as the sets Bi are the sets T
−1
i
applied to where Ri is mixing in {r}×X and the Ti are measure preserving,
a is also the probability throughout {r}×X that R1 is mixing and the same
holds for b and {r} × X . By Lemma 1, for any z ∈ X the probability of
both R1 mixing at (r, z) and R2 mixing at (r, z) cannot exceed
1
4000
(from
20
80·1000
= 1
4000
). From this we conclude that a+b ≤ c+ 1
1000
, since where (g, z)
is mixing at most 1
2000
of the points following in both (r, z) and (r, z) can be
mixing, (with the other 1
2000
referring to the possibility that G0 is not mixing
at (g, z) nevertheless one of the Ri players at (r, z) is mixing).
From ab ≤ 1
4
(a + b)2, and the above, we get the quadratic 0 ≤ c2 − 999
500
c +
3,001
1,000,000
. After completing the square we get that |c − 999
1000
| ≥ √.995. Since
c cannot be greater than 1 we are left with c < .999 − .9974 = .0016. The
probability that the parity rule is not followed for an x ∈ X is no more than
the probability of the G0 player mixing at either (g, T1x) or (g, T2x) plus the
probability that the R1 player at (r, T1x), the R2 player at (r, T2x) or the G0
player at (g, x) is not properly responding to the corresponding non-mixing
behaviour. These probabilities sum to .00395. . ✷
8
Next we show it is impossible for there to exist a 1
1000
equilibrium Borel
measurable equilibrium, using the regularity of the measure.
Let Cn be the set of cylinders of depth n, where the two cylinders defined by
the values xe = 0 and xe = 1 have depth 0. With 2n+1 − 1 words of length
n or less the cardinality of Cn is 22n+1−1 and m(c) = 2−2n+1+1 for all c ∈ Cn.
Recall the definition of A0 and A1 as the sets where either 0 or 1 is played
by G0 with probability at least
19
20
. For every c ∈ Cn and i = 0, 1 let wi(c)
be the conditional probability of action bi at the cylinder c, in other words
m(Ai ∩ c)/m(c). For every cylinder c define η(c) := mini=0,1wi(c) and let
r(c) be the conditional probability of belonging in the set where the parity
rule does not hold.
In the next lemma, we show that the parity rule is a powerful force to equalize
the probabilities for both actions b0 and b1. This cannot be guaranteed for
all cylinders, due to the small probability that the parity rule doesn’t hold.
But it does hold in general for most cylinders, regardless of the depth. Two
free generators and the dual causation implicit in the parity rule force this
equalization.
Lemma 3: In any 1
1000
equilibrium of the game, the average qi =
∑
c∈Ci
η(c)
|Ci|
is at least 1
3
for every i.
Proof: The proof is by induction. There are two elements in C0 and eight
elements in C1. Let c0 and c1 be the two elements of C0. Both cylinders c0 and
c1 are composed of four elements of C1, created (by means of T1 and T2) from
the combination of the two elements c0, c1 of C0 and the same two elements
c0, c1 of C0 along with a value of xe = 0 for all x ∈ c0 and xe = 1 for all
x ∈ c1. Let x0 and x1 be two points such that xe0 = 0, xe1 = 1, and xU0 = xU1
for every other U 6= e. However membership in A0 or A1 is determined by
T1xi and T2xi, the parity rule requires opposite memberships for i = 0, 1. As
the parity rule must hold in a set of size at least 1− 1
250
, it follows that in the
whole space the probability given to both A0 and A1 must be approximately
the same, more precisely these probabilities must be at least 124
250
for both A0
and A1. Now let c be either c0 or c1. As c is created by either the e position
being 0 or 1 and the four combinations of c0 and c1 in both direction T1 and
T2, whatever are the probabilities given for the two wi(c0) and the two wi(c1),
the fact that wi(c0)+wi(c1)
2
≥ 124
250
for both i = 0, 1, implies that the conditional
probability given to both A0 and A1 at c must be at least 2(
124
250
)2− 1
125
≥ .48.
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We assume the claim is true for every t ∈ Ci. Every t ∈ Ci+1 is created
through the combination of a pair c, d ∈ Ci with a determination of 0 or 1
(though this determination will play no rule in the following argument). Let
ic be the action that is less frequent at c, and define id the same way. Let
j be the action following from the parity rule determined by the value of
te and the combination of ic with id (however that is determined by the e
position). If r(c) = r(d) = r(t) = 0 then the parity rule would give j exactly
η(c)(1− η(d)) + η(d)(1− η(c)), as it would give the other action the greater
quantity (1−η(c))(1−η(d))+η(c)η(d). Due to the influence of the quantities
r(c), r(d), r(t) we cannot say for sure that j is the action less taken at t. But
we can say that η(t) ≥ −r(t)+η(c)(1−η(d)− r(d))+η(d)(1−η(c)− r(c)) ≥
η(c) + η(d) − 2η(c)η(d)) − r(t) − r(c)+r(d)
2
. But with
∑
c∈Cj
r(c) ≤ 1
250
|Cj |
for all j it follows that qi+1 ≥ − 1125 + 1|Ci|2
∑
c,d∈Ci
η(c) + η(d)− 2η(c)η(d) =
− 1
125
+ 1
|Ci|
∑
c∈Ci
η(c)+ 1
|Ci|
∑
d∈Ci
η(d)+ 1
|Ci|2
(
∑
c∈Ci
η(c))(
∑
d∈Ci
η(d)) = − 1
125
+
2qi − 2q2i . By induction we conclude that qi+1 ≥ 49 − 1125 > 13 . ✷
Theorem 1: There can be no Borel ( µ) measurable 1
1000
-equilibrium.
Proof: With η(c) defined as in the proof of Lemma 3, for the mutually
exclusive measurable sets A0, A1 of X it follows from the regularity of the
measure µ that limn→∞ qn = limn→∞
∑
c∈Cn
η(c)
|Cn|
= 0. But by Lemma 3 it never
falls below 1
3
. ✷
Notice that where the players are obeying the parity rule, even approximately
so, the location where the payoff to Player G0 is close to 2000 or to 1000 is
determined by one or the other of the two other players, by Player R1 in
the half {x ∈ X | xe = 0} and by Player R2 in the half {x ∈ X | xe = 1}.
Where the parity rule holds the Lesbegue measurability of the payoff of
Player G0 implies the Lesbegue measurability of the strategies of the Ri
players and hence also the Lesbegue measurability of the strategy of the G0
player in response. For the G0 player to have an “equilibrium payoff” by
some interpretation one must define that concept quite differently from the
existence of Harsanyi ǫ-equilibria.
4 Bayesian equilibria:
In this section we will show that we can colour the space X = {0, 1}G+
modulo a null set N using only two colours: 1 and 0 or red and blue, respec-
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tively, so that the parity rule is obeyed, and furthermore extend this to an
equilibrium of the whole space Ω. Recall that the parity rule is a function
c : X → X such that c(x) = c(T1(x))+c(T2(x))+xe (modulo 2). Notice that
such a colouring on such a set defines a Bayesian equilibrium on the subset
{g, r}× (X\N). We show then how to extend these strategies to a Bayesian
equilibrium on all of the space Ω = {g, r} ×X .
Recall the definition of the twins determined by some x, y ∈ X . We say that
a subset A of X is closed if for every pair x, y in A the twins determined
by x and y are also in A. By the closure A of a set A ⊆ X we mean the
smallest closed set containing A. We say that A ⊆ X is pyramidic if x ∈ A
implies that U(x) ∈ A, where U ∈ G+. The main example of pyramidic set
is G+(x), where x is an arbitrary element of X . Notice that whenever a set
is pyramidic that its closure is also pyramidic.
Define now the set
N = {x ∈ X : U(x) = V (x), for some distinct U, V ∈ G+}.
This set is a null set with respect to the product measure m onX . Indeed, for
any given two distinct words U, V ∈ G+, the equality implies an agreement
on infinitely many coordinates, and there are only countably many words
U ∈ G+.
We are ready to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4: Let X1 = X \N and let c be the parity rule defined on X . Then
there exists a colouring of X1 using the two colours {0, 1} which is consistent
with the rule c.
Proof: We will proceed by transfinite induction, assuming the Axiom of
Choice and thus Zorn’s Lemma. Let x0 be any element of X1 and obtain the
set P0 := G
+(x0). We define now the colouring of P0 of G
+(x0) as follows:
(i) colour all the points T1U(x0) in red, where U ∈ G+(x0) and U is the
identity or begins on the right with T1;
(ii) colour all the points T2V (x0) in blue, where V ∈ G+(x0) is the identity
or begins on the right with T1;
(iii) colour the remaining points of the pyramid P0 in the way that they
satisfy the rule c.
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After colouring all the points of P0, extend the colouring to all the points in
the closure P0 of P0.
Next create a partial ordering on colourings of pyramidic and closed subsets
of X that obey the parity rule, with one colouring greater than another if
the subset is larger and their colourings agree on their common intersection
(the smaller subset). Any tower of such colourings will define a colouring
that obeys the parity rule. As Zorn’s Lemma implies that there is a maximal
element (as a tower defines its own least upper bound), it suffices to show
that maximality implies that all of X1 has been coloured. Let P be any
pyramidic and closed subset of X1 with a colouring that obeys the parity
rule. Assume that P is not all of X1. Let x be the first member of X1 that
is not in P .
We say that x has a hitting point in P if U(x) ∈ P for some U ∈ G+ and
whenever U = VW and W is not the identity then V (x) 6∈ P .
Now we have the two cases:
Case 1) x has no hitting point with respect to P . Then we colour the closure
G+(x) in the same way as the initial pyramidic set P0.
Case 2) x has a hitting point in P . Then colour the elements of G+(x) taking
into an account the colours of the hitting points. Notice that the closure of
P implies that if Ux is not in P then one of TiUx is also not in P , so that
if TiUx is a hitting point then TjUx is not a hitting point, for i 6= j. This
allows us to colour x arbitrarily and then move downward in a consistent
way, with the colouring of TiUx determined already only if TjUx is a hitting
point or had just been just coloured arbitrarily (for j 6= i).
And then we colour the closure of G+(x) ∪ P according to the parity rule c
for a larger set that is closed, pyramidic, and consistent with both the parity
rule and the pre-existing colouring. ✷
Theorem 2: There exists a Bayesian equilibrium on all of Ω.
Proof: Following on from the proof of Lemma 4, let X1 be the closure of X1
and extend the colouring of X1 to one on X1. For all three players G0, R1
and R2 define pure strategies on D × X1 accordingly. With x any point in
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X\X1, let Γx be the game defined on D×G+(x) such that the strategies on
D× (G+(x)∩X1) are already fixed by the above colouring. As the game has
only countably many positions, by Simon (2003) there is a Nash equilibrium
defined on the game Γx. But notice that it defines an equilibrium when
including those strategies on D×(G+(x)∩X1) that are already fixed. Extend
this equilibrium to an equilibrium on the set D× (G+(x) ∩X1) through best
reply responses (noticing that nothing done at a point y has any influence on
any player at points Uy for any U 6= e - just consider x, T1x, T2x and follow
by induction). We can even assume that these best reply responses are pure
strategies. As with the proof of Lemma 4, we define a partial ordering on
pyramidic and closed subsets P of X and the equilibria defined on D×P . In
the same way, we show that an equilibrium can be defined on all of Ω, using
critically that any extension of an equilibrium from a closed and pyramidic
set P will not disturb the pre-existing equilibrium property on P . ✷
There are some points in X for which any equilibrium requires a mixed
strategy. Let x, y be the two points defined by xe = 0, ye = 1, T1(x) = y,
T2(x) = x, T1(y) = x and T2(y) = x. No matter how x is coloured, because
T1(y) = T2(y) = x and y
e = 1, y must be coloured with 1. But then
T1(x) = y, T2(x) = x and x
e = 0 forces x to be coloured differently from
itself.
5 Conclusion: open questions
Is there an example of an ergodic game (Simon 2003) that has no Harsanyi
ǫ-equilibrium for some positive ǫ? The examples of Simon (2003) and of
Hellman (2014) were ergodic games, and ergodic games have Bayesian equi-
libria (Simon 2003). We believe the answer is yes and that it can be done
through the action of a non-amenable group which defines the information
structure of the players. With the example of this paper, there was a very
strong mixing structure that kept the probability high for both actions at all
cylinders. We believe that the weaker mixing structure from a group action
would be sufficient to obtain the same result.
In the example of this paper, there are three players. Can the same result
be accomplished with two players? We believe that the answer is yes. The
structure of our example is similar to that of a free action of the free product
G = C2 ∗ C3 on {0, 1}G. We believe it can be done through associating C3
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with the knowledge of one player and C2 with the other player, (or with two
other finite groups whose free product is non-amenable).
Lastly, what is the relationship between Bayesian equilibria and the Banach-
Tarski paradox? Let G be a group acting in a measure preserving way on
a probability space X and for every player i let Gi be a finite subgroup of
G so that the information sets of Player i are the orbits of Gi and G is
generated by the Gi. Is there a Bayesian game so defined such that every
Bayesian equilibrium defines through its fibres a paradoxical decomposition
of the space where the group elements demonstrating the paradox belong to
G? On this question we are agnostic.
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